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A mythology has developed around the economics of the Clinton era. According to the 
mythology, the policies designed by Clinton’s Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin laid the basis 
for the prosperity of the late 1990s. These policies centered on getting the deficit down, and 
later running budget surpluses. The short-term pain associated with higher taxes and lower 
spending had a payoff in the form of more investment, more rapid productivity growth, 
higher job growth and rising real wages and income. 
 
This is nice mythology, but it is almost completely at odds with the reality. The growth burst 
of the late 1990s had little to do with deficit reduction (at least directly) and had everything 
to do with two unsustainable bubbles – a stock market bubble and a dollar bubble. The 
Clinton administration chose to ride the prosperity from these bubbles, even though it 
should have recognized that this prosperity was artificial, and would inevitably lead to a 
crash, followed by a painful adjustment process.  
 
The first section of this paper details the main trends in the economy in the Clinton years. 
The second section describes how the bubbles drove the economy and created the 
prosperity of the late 1990s. The third section outlines the long-term costs associated with 
the bubbles. The conclusion briefly explains how the bubbles could have been contained 
before they grew to such dangerous sizes.   
 
   2
Section 1: Deficit Reduction and the Beginnings of the Bubble 
Economy 
 
When President Clinton came into office in 1993 he had two conflicting agendas that he had 
promised to pursue. The first was his “public investment” agenda, centered on promoting 
investment in infrastructure, research and development, and education and training. This 
position was most strongly identified with Labor Secretary Robert Reich. The second agenda 
was deficit reduction – the belief that the top priority must be to reduce the deficit to a 
sustainable level, if not eliminate it altogether. This position was most strongly associated 
with then Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Robert Rubin, the head of Clinton’s 
National Economic Council.   
 
Clearly it was not possible to both promote substantial increases in public investment and 
reduce the deficit at the same time. After the defeat of a modest stimulus package in the 
summer of 1993, the main focus of Clinton’s economic policy through the rest of his 
administration was the reduction of the deficit. As the deficit shrank more rapidly than had 
been anticipated, the goal shifted to a balanced budget and later to paying off the national 
debt. Throughout this process, public investment took a back seat, with most categories of 
public investment no higher (measured relative to the size of the economy) at the end of 
Clinton’s administration than at the beginning.
1 
 
The rapid decline in the deficit was partly due to tax increases and spending restraint, and 
partly to an unexpected surge in tax revenue.
2 In fiscal 1992, the last full fiscal year before 
President Clinton took office, the deficit was $290.4 billion or 4.7 percent of GDP. The 
deficit in 1997, the last budget prepared in his first term in office, was just $22.0 billion, or   3
0.3 percent of GDP. In 2000, the surplus peaked at $236.4 billion, an amount equal to 2.4 
percent of GDP.   
 
Whatever the cause, President Clinton certainly could boast of solid economic growth, 
especially through his second term in office. For his presidency as whole, annual GDP 
growth rate averaged 3.6 percent. Job growth averaged 2.8 million per year and the median 
hourly wage rose at a 0.5 percent annual rate. For the second term, annual GDP growth 
averaged 3.9 percent, job creation averaged 2.8 million per year, and the real median wage 
grew at a 2.0 percent annual rate, with unemployment falling to just 4.0 percent in 2000.
3 By 
these statistics, and most other measures, the economy’s performance during Clinton’s 
second term was the best since the late sixties.  
 
The proponents of deficit reduction took this performance as a vindication of their program. 
However, closer examination shows that this was not the case. According to the deficit 
reduction proponents, lower deficits were supposed to reduce demand for borrowing and 
thereby lead to lower interest rates. Lower interest rates should then stimulate both 
investment and net exports (by lowering the value of the dollar), which would then boost the 
economy. The boost to investment would not only increase demand, by increasing the 
amount of capital per worker; it would lead to higher productivity and thereby higher 
potential output.  
 
Regardless of the general validity of this theoretical view of the economy, it clearly does not 
explain the growth spurt in the mid and late 1990s. None of the pieces of the argument fit. 
Real interest rates did fall, but not by an especially large amount, there was an upturn in   4
investment, but it was not nearly large enough to produce the sort of upturn in productivity 
the economy actually experienced, and the dollar and net exports went the wrong way – the 
dollar rose and net exports fell.
4    
 
Table 1 shows real interest rates for 10-year treasury bonds, 30-year mortgages, and high 
grade corporate debt for the last three years of the major business cycles from the sixties 
through the 1990s. While the real interest rates of the second Clinton term are somewhat 
lower than during the eighties cycle, they are much higher than in either the sixties or 
seventies cycles. Even the gap with the eighties cycle appears much less dramatic when 
focusing on private debt. As the government began running a surplus and paying down its 
debt, investors were willing to pay a scarcity premium to obtain U.S. government debt, 
increasing the spread with private debt. Of course it is the interest rate on private debt that 
affects the real economy. As can be seen, the declines in the real mortgage rate and the real 
corporate bond rate were just 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. Real mortgage and 
corporate rates remained several percentage points higher than their levels in the sixties and 
seventies cycles.  
 
Modest declines in interest rates do not produce explosions in investment, and no such 
explosion took place in the Clinton years. Table 2 shows the shares of the major 
components of GDP for the middle Clinton years (95-97), the late Clinton years (98-2000) 
and the late seventies and late eighties. While there is an increase in investment over this 
period, it is dwarfed by the increase in consumption. The investment levels of the Clinton 
years were higher than in the eighties cycle, but they never reached the peaks hit in the 
seventies cycle. It is also important to note that the Clinton years look even less impressive if   5
net investment is used as the basis for comparison. Column 6 of Table 2 shows that net 
investment measured as a share of GDP was 1.0 percentage point higher than in the eighties, 
but 1.6 percentage points lower than in the seventies cycle.
5  
 
In spite of the limited upturn in investment, there was undeniably a sharp upturn in 
productivity growth. Annual rates of productivity growth are shown in the last column of 
Table 2. As can be seen, productivity growth turned sharply upward beginning in 1996, even 
before there had been any substantial upturn in investment. (The upturn actually began in 
the fourth quarter of 1995, when productivity grew at a 3.1 percent annual rate.)  There is no 
plausible story in which the surge in productivity growth that originated in 1995 can be 
attributed in any important way to the increases in investment witnessed up to this point.
6  
 
Rather than being a result of investment induced by deficit reduction, the surge in 
productivity appears to have been an exogenous development associated with information 
technology. This is demonstrated most clearly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics' measure of 
technology induced productivity growth (multifactor productivity growth). Technology 
contributed an average of just 0.4 percentage points to productivity growth over the years 
from 1973 to 1995. This increased by 0.7 percentage points to an annual rate of 1.1 
percentage point in the years 1995 to 2000. Whether or not the Clinton era policies made it 
easier to embrace these technologies is an open question, but clearly deficit reduction cannot 
be given the credit for the upturn.    
   6
Section 2: The Dynamics of the Bubbles 
 
As the data in Table 2 show, the largest increase in GDP shares occurred in consumption, 
not investment. The consumption share of GDP in 2000 was 68.7 percent, more than 3 full 
percentage points higher than its share at the peak of the last business cycle. There was a 
simple explanation for this consumption surge – the wealth effect associated with the stock 
bubble. At this point, there is a large body of literature linking stock wealth with 
consumption.
7 The conventional range of estimates is that an additional dollar of stock 
wealth leads to an additional 3-4 cents of consumption spending.  
 
At the peak of the stock bubble in 2000, the total value of the equity issues held by the 
household sector was $11.0 trillion. This corresponded to a price to earnings ratio of 30.
8 
Historically, the price to earnings ratio has averaged approximately 14.5. Measured against 
this ratio, at the peak of the stock bubble in 2000, households held approximately $5.0 
trillion of bubble wealth in stocks, which would have led to $150 to $200 billion in additional 
consumption due to the wealth effect. This would explain most of the upturn in 
consumption seen in this period, as the savings rate fell to what were at the time record 
lows.
9 In short, one of the main props of the Clinton era prosperity was a consumption 
boom, driven by the stock bubble. 
 
A second prop was a surge in imports driven by the rising value of the dollar. Early in the 
Clinton administration the dollar fell against most major currencies. This was viewed by 
many economists as a predicted and desirable result of deficit reduction. Lower deficits lead 
to lower interest rates, which should make dollar denominated assets relatively less attractive 
to both domestic and foreign investors. The decline in the value of the dollar makes U.S.   7
goods more competitive in world markets, reducing imports and increasing exports. The 
change in relative prices should reduce or eliminate the trade deficit, making the United 
States again a net exporter of capital, the normal situation for a wealthy country. 
 
While events loosely followed this script in the first half of the Clinton years -- the trade 
deficit was 1.2 percent of GDP in 1997, compared to a peak deficit equal to 3.1 percent of 
GDP in 1987 -- there was a sharp turn of events with the rise of the dollar beginning in 
1996. Instead of allowing the dollar to drift downward, Robert Rubin committed the country 
to strong dollar policy.  
 
This commitment, coupled with the flight to dollars following the East Asian financial crisis 
in 1997, led to a rise in the dollar of 26 percent on a trade weighted basis.
10 The higher dollar 
had the positive short-term effect of making low cost imported goods available. This 
reduced inflation and raised average living standards for the country as a whole.
11 However, 
it also led to a rapid increase in the trade deficit. By 2000, the trade deficit had risen to a then 
record 3.9 percent of GDP.  
 
The trade deficit has continued to rise in subsequent years, even as the dollar has lost some 
of its value. Trade adjusts slowly to changes in currency values. The trade deficit was rising 
very rapidly at the end of the Clinton years. It continued to increase in 2001, although the 
rate of increase was slowed by the onset of the recession. The trade deficit for 2004 was 5.2 
percent of GDP. It almost certainly would have been even higher if the dollar had not begun 
to decline from its earlier level.  
   8
In sum, the prosperity of the late Clinton years rested in large part on two unsustainable 
bubbles. The stock bubble prompted a huge surge in consumption, as the wealth effect from 
inflated stock prices drove savings rates to what were at the time record lows. The bubble 
also led to an upsurge of investment, much of which was subsequently revealed to be 
wasteful, after the collapse of the stock bubble. The dollar bubble allowed for low priced 
imports and a higher standard of living than would otherwise be possible, but this came at 
the price of soaring trade deficits. The economy has yet to complete its adjustment to this 
second bubble. 
 
Section 3: The Costs of the Clinton Bubbles 
 
While the Clinton era bubbles did create prosperity in the short-term, this prosperity came at 
a substantial price, not all of which can be fully appreciated today. Starting with the stock 
bubble, the negative long-term effects are largely the flip-side of the positive short-term 
effects. At the macro level, just as the bubble provided a huge boost to demand through 
both investment and consumption expenditures, its collapse led to a substantial falloff in 
demand.  
 
This was seen most clearly in the sharp downturn in investment that the economy 
experienced in 2001. Nominal investment fell by more than $50 billion from 2000 to 2001, 
leading to a decline of a full percentage point in the investment share of GDP. The recession 
of 2001 was the first investment-led recession in the post-war period. All prior recessions 
had been driven primarily by a drop in home building and car purchases due to rising 
interest rates. This distinction is important, because it is very easy to recover from this more 
traditional form of recession – the Fed simply lowers interest rates, which boosts home   9
construction and car buying, an effect that is especially strong since the falloff in these 
sectors during the recession leads to pent-up demand. 
 
However, it is much harder to stimulate the economy when the recession is due to a 
downturn in investment. Investment is not very sensitive to interest rates, and even sharp 
declines in interest rates are likely to only have a minimal impact on investment. The route 
that the Fed chose to boost the economy following the 2001 recession was to promote 
further expansion of the housing bubble –effectively using the expansion of one bubble to 
counteract the collapse of another bubble (Baker, 2002). As mortgage rates fell to 50-year 
lows, a spurt in home building and a surge in consumption (driven by mortgage refinancing) 
sustained a modest recovery. However, it is only a matter of time before the economy has to 
deal with the wreckage from the collapse of this new bubble.  
 
The stock bubble also led to much misdirected investment. When the NASDAQ was at its 
peaks in 1999 and 2000, many companies with no coherent business strategy were able to 
raise hundreds of millions, or even billions, by issuing stock. This led to much wasted 
investment, most of it in the tech sector.  
 
The bubble also created the basis for the accounting scandals of the late 1990s. At a time 
when many investors were willing to accept at face value almost any claim made by 
corporate executives, it was easy to hide accounting tricks or outright fraud at companies like 
Global Crossing, Enron, and WorldCom.  
   10
The stock bubble also laid the basis for the pension crisis of the last few years. Most 
companies with traditional defined benefit pension plans were able to contribute little or 
nothing to these plans during the bubble years, because the stock market rose enough to 
meet required funding levels.
12 However, when stocks tumbled in the 2000-2002 crash, many 
of the country’s largest pension funds were suddenly hugely under-funded. This shortfall 
posed a substantial burden on even the healthiest companies. However, defined benefit 
pensions are concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which has been hard hit by the over-
valued dollar. As a result, many companies with defined benefit pension plans were forced 
into bankruptcy and their pensions were turned over to the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation, which is now facing insolvency.  
 
Probably the most serious fallout from the stock bubble was that it discouraged millions of 
workers from saving enough to prepare themselves sufficiently for retirement. With the 
market rising at double digit rates through the second half of the 1990s, many workers not 
only assumed that past gains would be enduring, but that this rate of growth would continue. 
As a result, they saw little reason to save from current income. It is remarkable, that at a time 
when virtually the entire baby boom cohort was in its peak savings years, the savings rate hit 
the lowest levels seen up until that point. While saving as a share of disposable income 
averaged 9.6 percent in the seventies, and 9.0 percent in eighties, it averaged just 3.3 percent 
from 1996 to 2000, hitting 2.3 percent in 2000 itself.
13 
 
The collapse of the bubble also hurt millions of older workers who lost much of their 
retirement savings, and caused them to change their retirement plans in huge numbers. From 
January of 2001 to January of 2005 the number of workers over age 55 rose by 4.1 million,   11
an increase of 22.2 percent. This growth is especially striking given the weakness of the labor 
market during this period. Employment of workers under age 55 actually fell by 1.7 million 
between 2001 and 2005.
14 
 
The country has yet to feel the full impact of the adjustment from the dollar bubble because 
it has only partially deflated. The trade deficit continues to expand even as the dollar has 
begun to decline from the peaks reached in 2002. The dollar will surely have to fall much 
further before the deficit reaches a sustainable level. The short-term impact of this 
adjustment process will be very painful – it will be the exact reverse of the benefits of the 
high dollar in the 1990s. Import prices will rise, pushing up inflation and lowering living 
standards.  
 
The presence of inflationary pressures due to rising import prices will make it especially 
difficult to pursue expansionary policies to boost the economy following the collapse of the 
housing bubble. The Fed will be under serious pressure to maintain high interest rates to 
support the dollar and contain inflation, rather than lowering rates to boost demand. Of 
course the exact dynamic of this process is impossible to predict, but the prospect of falling 
demand coinciding with rising prices is not a pretty story. 
 
As a long-term phenomena, the late 1990s surge in the dollar was especially unfortunate. 
With the baby boomers still in their peak earning years, this was exactly the period when the 
United States should have been accumulating a large quantity of foreign assets to help meet 
the expense of the baby boomers’ retirement. Instead, the United States sold off a large 
portion of it capital stock to foreign investors. As a result, the country will be exporting a   12
substantial percentage of its output to foreign investors at the same time the baby boomers 
are retiring in large numbers.   
 
Finally, the process of losing industry to foreign competition is not easily reversible. When 
factories shut down because an over-valued dollar has made them uncompetitive, their work 
force scatters and the machinery is not maintained. If the over-valuation is eventually 
corrected, eight or ten years later, the factory is unlikely to reopen, even if it would have 
been competitive had the dollar never become over-valued. This loss of capacity may make it 
especially hard to restore the trade deficit to a sustainable level. It could mean that the dollar 
has to fall much more than would otherwise have been the case – reaching levels that are far 
lower than the ones in place before the dollar bubble. This implies even more inflation and a 
greater decline in living standards.  
 
Conclusion: How Clinton/Rubin Missed the Boat 
 
It was easy to recognize that both the stock market and the dollar were experiencing 
unsustainable bubbles in the late 1990s. The stock market eventually reached price to 
earnings ratios that were twice the historic average at a time when the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) was actually projecting that profits would fall in real terms over the next 
decade (CBO, 2000, Table 2-1). There was no way to reconcile these projections, unless 
stockholders were willing to accept returns that were only slightly higher than those available 
on government bonds – an implausible proposition.
15  
 
Similarly, the over-valuation of the dollar should have been apparent by the surge in the 
trade deficit. The dollar is the main mechanism equilibrating trade. While there is no need to   13
have balanced trade (just like there is no need to have a balanced budget), it clearly is 
impossible to sustain a large and growing trade deficit, which was the path that Rubin’s high 
dollar policy set the country along. 
 
Piercing these bubbles would have required political courage, but would not have been 
difficult. If the Treasury Secretary, the Fed Chairman, or any high-profile government 
official had made a point of showing that price to earnings ratios of 30 were inconsistent 
with all plausible estimates of future profit growth, it is difficult to believe that the market 
would not have reacted. Certainly any fund managers who ignored this warning would be 
facing lawsuits and job loss when confronted by the inevitable crash. Similarly, talking the 
dollar down can go a long way, as can the Treasury’s ability to intervene directly in currency 
markets. The United States does not have to keep an over-valued currency, unless it wants 
one. 
 
But no one in a position of responsibility chose to act prudently.  Our political leaders' 
decision to ignore dangers of the stock bubble, and to actively promote the dollar bubble, 
harmed the economy in ways that we will be feeling for decades to come.  Allowing, or even 
encouraging, the growth of these bubbles was one of the greatest mistakes in economic 
policy in the history of the United States.   14
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Bond  Mortgages 
Corporate 
Bonds 
  (10-year)   (30 year)  Aaa 
1967  1.9  3.4  2.4 
1968  1.4  2.7  1.9 
1969  2.0  2.8  2.0 
Average  1.8  2.9  2.1 
       
1977  1.0  2.6  1.6 
1978  1.4  2.6  1.7 
1979  1.1  2.5  1.3 
Average  1.2  2.6  1.6 
       
1987  5.7  6.6  6.7 
1988  5.5  5.8  6.3 
1989  4.7  6.3  5.5 
Average  5.3  6.2  6.2 
       
1998  4.2  6.0  5.4 
1999  4.3  5.6  5.6 
2000  3.8  5.3  5.4 
Average  4.1  5.6  5.5 
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Table 2 
 
Historical Perspectives on The Composition of GDP and Productivity Growth  
in the Clinton Years 
 
  Shares of GDP            
               







               
1977  63.0  11.3  5.4  20.4  -1.1  4.9  1.6 
1978  62.3  12.2  5.7  19.8  -1.1  5.8  1.3 
1979  62.1  13.0  5.5  19.5  -0.9  6.1  -0.4 
Average  62.4  12.2  5.6  19.9  -1.0  5.6  0.8 
               
1987  65.4  11.1  4.9  21.1  -3.1  2.9  0.3 
1988  65.7  11.0  4.7  20.4  -2.2  3.0  1.6 
1989  65.6  11.1  4.4  20.0  -1.6  2.9  0.7 
Average  65.6  11.1  4.7  20.5  -2.3  2.9  0.9 
               
1995  67.3  10.9  4.1  18.5  -1.2  2.6  0.9 
1996  67.2  11.2  4.3  18.1  -1.2  3.0  2.5 
1997  66.8  11.7  4.2  17.7  -1.2  3.4  2.0 
Average  67.1  11.3  4.2  18.1  -1.2  3.0  1.8 
               
1998  67.2  12.0  4.4  17.4  -1.8  3.8  2.6 
1999  67.8  12.2  4.6  17.5  -2.8  4.0  2.3 
2000  68.7  12.6  4.6  17.5  -3.9  4.1  3.0 
Average  67.9  12.3  4.5  17.5  -2.8  4.0  2.6 
               
Source: Economic Report of the President, Tables B1 and B49. 